The appellant in this case was Mamie R. Jemison, while the respondent was Grantley E. Crichlow.
A key factor in the case is that CPLR 215(1) states that when an action is brought against a sheriff as a result of an action or lack of an action performed in the official capacity of that office, that the action must start within a year of the accrual of the cause of that action (or omission of fulfillment of his duty). A New York Injury Lawyer said there is an exception provided for within CPLR 215(1), but it does not apply in this case. The plaintiffs in this case assert that Grantley E. Crichlow is not covered by the terms of CPLR 215(1) or two reasons. The assertion is that it does not apply to City Marshals. The second is that the year-long statute of limitations is not applicable when allegations of malevolent misconduct or allegations of intentional misconduct are the cause of the initiation of the action.
City Marshals and Maliciousness
Kolomensky V. Wiener shows that the court has recently determined that City Marshals are covered under the terms of CPLR 215(1). This resulted in the first protest being immediately rejected as regards the applicability of CPLR 215(1). The second argument was also rejected. CPLR 215(1) is worded plainly, and no interpretation provides for an exemption based on perceived maliciousness of a given action.
The allegations of the plaintiffs states that on April 11, 1983, they were evicted from an apartment. Allegedly, Crichlow, who has a license as a process server and who serves as a City Marshal, forcibly evicted them from a residence at West 31st Street, Brooklyn New York. This eviction was performed pursuant to a Kings County Civil Court judgment entered upon the default of the plaintiffs. A Long Island Personal Injury Lawyer said the complaint alleges that Crichlow falsely stated in a filing with the court that a previous dispossess notice had been served to the tenants of the apartment. This omission was declared to be committed willfully and with the full knowledge of Crichlow according to the terms of the original complaint. Allegations of negligence in the performance of his duty were also levied against Crichlow.
The following events lead up to the presently discussed action.
1. Plaintiff’s sought financial compensation and damages for their eviction, while also claiming other issues such as trespassing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, inference with contractual relations, constitutional right violations, etc. etc.
2. Crichlow moved that the complaint be dismissed due to the elapsed time in regards to the Statute of Limitations and because no cause of action had been stated.
3. The plaintiff’s attorney opposes that motion was filed to obtain an extension when the end of three years outlined in the Statue of Limitations was about to elapse.
4. It was found that all of the plaintiff’s causes for action should be prevented as a result of the Statute of Limitations.
A Manhattan Personal Injury Lawyer said as a result of the applicable Statutes of Limitations as determined by the court, all the causes of action originally filed by the plaintiff were dismissed except one. The original order which dismissed the ninth cause of action is modified by the deletion of that provision. The replacement provision stated that Crichlow’s motion denying that cause of action be denied. The first complaint was eliminated as a result of a one-year statute of limitations, the rest as result of a three-year statute of limitations. The order was modified so that the plaintiff’s claim that their constitutional rights had been violated was reinstated.
When a legal matter arises, whether it is from a car accident, eviction or medical malpractice incident, Stephen Bilkis & Associates are there to help you evaluate your legal options. Our lawyers understand any circumstance that you might find yourself in, and will strive to obtain a favorable outcome for you. Free consultations are available at our offices found throughout metropolitan New York.