The infant plaintiffs, by their natural guardian, and the guardian individually, commenced an action against the defendants Corporation and private individual by the filing of summons and complaint in the office of the County Clerk of Westchester County on 11 October 1995. The complaint alleges, among other things, that the Corporation and the private individual were responsible for the operation and maintenance of certain apartments located in Westchester County, including the apartment in which the infant plaintiffs resided. The complaint alleges that the infant plaintiffs were each “caused to ingest, consume and/or be exposed to lead paint and/or dust which was upon and/or caused, allowed and permitted to chip, peel, fall and/or permeate the premises from the interior walls and portions of said apartment”; that as a result of the infants’ ingestion of these noxious substances, they were severely injured (head injury, deafness, paralysis and the like) and suffered “great physical pain”; that each of the infants “incurred and in the future would necessarily incur further hospital and/or medical expenses in an effort to be cured”; and that the natural guardian had, on account of the injuries to the two infants, “been required to expend various sums of money for extraordinary medical care, consultation, advice, therapy, education, management and treatment of the infants.”
A New York Injury Lawyer said that by virtue of a “notice of lien” dated 2 November 1998, the guardian, as well as the attorneys representing him and the infant plaintiffs, the defendants, and the defendants’ attorneys, were notified that the Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Social Services (hereinafter the DSS) was asserting a lien in the sum of $132,204.73 to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the settlement noted above. The defendants assert that this was their first notice of any such lien.
The issue here is whether or not the representatives of an infant plaintiff, on whose behalf a settlement of a personal injury action has been reached, may completely defeat enforcement of the Medicaid lien by the simple expedient of declaring that the settlement related solely to the infant’s claim for pain and suffering?
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