In Cover v. Cohen, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed whether a car manufactured by General Motors was defective under strict products liability. The case also considered whether the evidence presented at trial was proper and whether the judgment against both General Motors and the car dealer, Kinney Motors, should stand. The court’s decision clarified how post-manufacture safety standards and later modifications may be treated in a design defect claim.
Background Facts
In June 1974, Irving Cohen was operating a 1973 Chevrolet Malibu. He had purchased the vehicle from Kinney Motors in October 1972. According to Cohen, while attempting to parallel park on a Brooklyn street, he placed the car in reverse when it suddenly accelerated backward. He claimed the car would not stop despite having his foot on the brake. The car traveled 70 feet in reverse, mounted a curb, and struck a building.
Astor Cover, a pedestrian on the sidewalk, was pinned against the wall by the car. He suffered permanent injuries including an above-the-knee amputation and damage to the other leg that required a brace.
Cover and his wife filed a negligence suit against Cohen. After Cohen’s death, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to include Kinney Motors and General Motors, asserting claims of negligence and strict liability.
At trial, the jury found that Cohen, General Motors, and Kinney Motors were each partly responsible for the accident. It found the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in the throttle return spring. The jury awarded $6 million to Astor Cover and $2 million to his wife. The court reduced the damages to $3 million and $1 million, respectively. The Appellate Division further reduced the awards to $2 million and $300,000, and plaintiffs accepted the reduction.
General Motors appealed. Although Kinney Motors did not appeal, it submitted a brief arguing that any reversal of General Motors’ liability required reversal of the judgment against it as well.
Question Before the Court
The Court of Appeals considered whether evidence admitted at trial, including a federal motor vehicle safety standard, a used spring from the vehicle, and a police officer’s report, should have been excluded. It also considered whether Kinney Motors should receive the benefit of a reversal even though it had not appealed. Finally, the court examined whether the technical service bulletin issued by General Motors was properly admitted to support a failure-to-warn theory.
Court’s Decision
The court held that General Motors was entitled to a new trial. The court found that the introduction of several pieces of evidence was improper and prejudiced the jury. This included evidence of a federal motor vehicle safety standard that applied only to later model vehicles, the throttle return spring that had been removed from the car over a year after the accident, and a police report quoting Cohen as saying his “accelerator stuck.”
The court also concluded that if the judgment against General Motors was reversed, then the judgment against Kinney Motors, which was based entirely on General Motors’ liability, must also be reversed. The Court of Appeals granted a new trial for both defendants.
Discussion
The court focused first on the federal safety standard known as Standard 124, which became effective for 1974 models. The accident involved a 1973 model, so the court ruled that the standard was not applicable. Although the final version of the standard was not admitted into evidence, the jury heard testimony and saw documents indicating that the government had adopted a different standard requiring a safer spring design. The court explained that this was improper in a design defect case when the manufacturer had already conceded that safer alternatives were feasible. Under existing law, post-manufacture standards are not admissible to show the product was unsafe when sold.
The court next reviewed the spring removed from the car 15 months after the crash. It had been stretched, and no foundation was laid to show that it was in the same condition as at the time of the accident. The court found that its admission could have misled the jury.
The court also found error in allowing a police officer’s report that quoted Cohen as saying his accelerator stuck. This statement was hearsay and did not fall within any accepted exception, including the business record or declaration against interest exceptions. The report was not trustworthy because Cohen was not under any duty to report to the officer and may have had a reason to deflect blame.
In addition, the court addressed the admission of a technical service bulletin issued by General Motors over a year after Cohen received the car. The bulletin referenced erratic idle speeds and slow return to idle in some 1973 cars. The court found that the bulletin was not admissible to prove a design defect or initial failure to warn. However, it could be admissible in a future trial if used to support a claim that General Motors failed to warn consumers after the sale. A manufacturer may have a duty to warn of dangers discovered after manufacture or sale.
The court outlined factors a jury could consider in determining whether a post-sale duty to warn exists. These included the seriousness of the risk, the number of reported incidents, how easily the manufacturer could identify and notify customers, and any steps the company took to fix the issue.
Finally, the court addressed whether Kinney Motors, a non-appealing party, should benefit from the reversal. The judgment against Kinney Motors was based entirely on General Motors’ liability and the theory of strict liability. Since the court found that General Motors was entitled to a new trial, and Kinney had been granted indemnification by General Motors, it ruled that Kinney was also entitled to a new trial. Otherwise, General Motors could be forced to pay a judgment in a case where the product might be found not defective on retrial.