In Scurry v New York City Housing Authority, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the Housing Authority could avoid liability where intruders gained access to buildings through doors with broken locks and committed violent attacks. The key question was whether the targeted nature of the attacks severed the link between NYCHA’s failure to maintain secure entryways and the resulting injuries.
Background Facts
The Court of Appeals decided two related cases. Both involved murders committed by intruders who entered public housing complexes where exterior doors allegedly lacked working locks.
In Scurry, Bridget Crushshon lived in a NYCHA building in the Cypress Hills complex. Her former partner, Walter Boney, had a history of violent behavior toward her. One morning, Boney entered the building, hid in the hallway, and attacked Crushshon with gasoline and fire as she left her apartment. She died at the scene, and her son Bryan, who tried to help, sustained severe burn injuries.
In Murphy, eighteen-year-old Tayshana Murphy lived in the Grant Houses. There had been tensions between her friends and residents of another housing complex. On the night of her murder, Murphy and her friends ran into their building through a side door after seeing individuals from the rival group. That door, which was supposed to self-lock, did not close properly. Minutes later, two men entered through the unlocked door and shot Murphy in the stairwell.
In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that NYCHA’s failure to maintain locking exterior doors allowed the intruders to enter the buildings and cause harm.
Question Before the Court
The legal question was whether NYCHA’s admitted failure to ensure that exterior doors locked properly was a substantial cause of the attacks. NYCHA argued that the attackers were targeting their victims and would have gained access to the buildings regardless of whether the doors were locked. Therefore, NYCHA claimed that its conduct did not legally cause the injuries and that it should be granted summary judgment in both cases.
Court’s Decision
The Court of Appeals ruled that NYCHA was not entitled to summary judgment in either case. In Scurry, it affirmed the Second Department’s denial of NYCHA’s motion. In Murphy, it reversed the First Department’s order granting summary judgment and sent the case to trial.
The court explained that in premises liability cases involving third-party criminal attacks, a defendant’s negligence may be a substantial cause of injury even if the attack was targeted. The court reiterated that questions of proximate cause should usually be decided by a jury, not by the court as a matter of law.
Discussion
The court relied on earlier rulings, including Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp. and Turturro v City of New York, to establish the legal framework. In these cases, the court explained that landlords have a duty to take minimal precautions, such as maintaining locked entry doors, to protect tenants from foreseeable harm.
The court rejected NYCHA’s argument that the attacks were so planned and determined that they broke the chain of causation. In both cases, the attackers entered through doors that were supposed to be locked but were not. In Murphy, video footage showed the attackers trying the main door, finding it locked, then using the malfunctioning side door. The court found that a jury could conclude that a locked side door would have stopped or delayed the attackers, giving Murphy a chance to escape.
In Scurry, the attacker was a former domestic partner, which made the situation different from a random crime. However, the court still found that his ability to enter through an unlocked door raised factual questions. Whether he would have been able to commit the attack had the door been secured was a question for a jury to decide.
The court also addressed NYCHA’s argument that it lacked notice of the broken door lock in Murphy. NYCHA had caretaker logs stating the door was functioning, but the estate submitted affidavits and surveillance footage indicating otherwise. Ms. Murphy’s mother had complained about the broken door, and a locksmith expert confirmed that the lock was not working. These disputes over fact made summary judgment inappropriate.
The court further explained that an intervening criminal act does not automatically break the chain of causation. It must be extraordinary or entirely unrelated to the defendant’s conduct. In these cases, the harm suffered—attacks by intruders entering through unsecured doors—was the very risk that NYCHA’s duty was meant to prevent.
The decision emphasized that the mental state or intent of an attacker does not decide the legal issue of proximate cause. The court made it clear that determining whether a locked door would have prevented the attack is a fact-specific inquiry. As long as there is a reasonable argument that the attacker would have been deterred, the issue should go to a jury.
Conclusion
In both Scurry and Murphy, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that factual questions existed about whether NYCHA’s failure to maintain working door locks contributed to the attacks. These were not cases where the attackers’ intent could be treated as the only cause. The court reinforced that in premises security cases, summary judgment is not appropriate when facts are in dispute about whether a landlord’s negligence allowed a criminal act to occur.
The decision clarified that a targeted attack does not automatically release a landlord from liability if its negligence created an opportunity for the attacker to strike. Whether a working door lock would have prevented harm is a question for the jury.
If you or a loved one has been injured in a building where the property owner failed to provide proper security, you may have a legal claim. Contact an experienced New York premises liability lawyer at Stephen Bilkis & Associates to learn about your options and protect your rights.