Staten Island

Published on: July 27, 2012

Defendants request summary judgement in a case involving injuries from exposure to lead paint – Scott v. City of New York, 2007 NY Slip Op 33484(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 9/27/2007)

by Stephen Bilkis

Plaintiffs include several members of the Scott family, including 19 children, who resided at the Brooklyn Arms Hotel which is owned by defendant Fields. The Hotel was leased to Merco. In 1981 the plaintiffs were homeless. The City of New York placed them in the hotel. The plaintiffs claim that from the years 1981 through 1984, several of the Scott children were exposed to lead paint while at the hotel. The plaintiffs also claim that while they lived at the hotel there were no attempts made to correct the hazardous lead paint condition. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the plaintiffs based on negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that the Housing and Maintenance Code for New York City was violated.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgement dismissing the case. The purpose of a summary judgement motion is to ask the court to dismiss the case without the case having to go to trial. The court will grant a motion for summary dismissal of a case if the defendant produces evidence that demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact. This means that based on the undisputed facts, the law requires that the defendant wins.

In support of their summary judgement motion, the defendants make arguments related to not being aware of the problem, not having regular access to the premises, not having control over the premises, and not being aware that children lived there. The court determined that some of the defendants’ arguments are specious. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion, the court concluded that there were indeed questions of fact. For example, the court found that there were questions of fact with regard to whether the defendants were aware that paint was peeling the Hotel, whether they were aware that children under the age of 7 lived in the Hotel, and who had complete and exclusive control over the Hotel. Thus, on the issue of negligence, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement. However, the court did grant the defendants’ summary judgement motion to the extent that the plaintiffs will not be allowed to recover claims related to the breach of warranty of habitability or their claims of nuisance.

Published on: July 19, 2012

Court denies defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice birth injury case – McLaughlin v. Royek, 2007 NY Slip Op 32242(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 7/17/2007)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this birth injury medical malpractice case, the defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that he did not deviate from accepted medical standards in his care and treatment of a pregnant woman by delaying performing a cesarean section delivery despite evidence that the baby was in distress.

Plaintiff McLaughlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of her infant son who was born in 1998 prematurely with an extremely low birth weight. The plaintiff contends that as a result of the negligent care of the defendants, her son suffered a variety of serious, permanent birth injuries including brain damage; status encephalopathy; fetal hypoxia; cerebral palsy; exacerbation of injuries related to prematurity; developmental delays; cognitive and speech deficits; and the need for braces on his extremities.

On September 5, 1998, the plaintiff, who was 23 weeks pregnant, was admitted to St. Charles Hospital with swelling of the legs and decreased fetal movement. St. Charles Hospital (a non-defendant) transferred the plaintiff to Stony Brook Hospital so that she would have access to its neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) in case the baby had to be delivered prematurely.

Published on: July 11, 2012

Defendant Awarded Partial Summary Judgement in Medical Malpractice Action

by Stephen Bilkis

This case is being heard in the Bronx County Supreme Court in the state of New York. The case involves the deceased infant, Kayla Kesse Madison Charles. The plaintiffs are the administrix of the estate of the deceased infant, Dionne Charles and Dionne Charles on her own. The defendants in the case are Doctor Chaisurat Suvannavejh, Doctor, Fergal D. Malone, Doctor Michael J. Orfino, Elizabeth Riley, R.N., Susan Zucchero, R.N., and the Lawrence Hospital Center.

Case Background

The plaintiff on behalf of herself and her deceased daughter is suing the defendants for medical malpractice that resulted in the wrongful death of her daughter. A New York Injury Lawyer said the defendants of the case, Suvannavejh, Zucchero, and the Lawrence Hospital Center all separately move for a summary judgment that dismissed the claims made by the mother in regard to emotional distress, and loss of comfort and affection. Additionally, the defendant Suvannavejh seeks for the claim made by the mother in regard to lost support, services, and protection be dismissed.

Published on: July 9, 2012

Respondents Claim Petitioner in Violation of Public Health Laws

by Stephen Bilkis

The petitioner for this case is Lena Bagels, Inc. The respondent of the case is The City of New York and the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. The case is being heard in the New York Supreme Court. The judge overseeing the case is Philip G. Minardo.

Case

Lena Bagels operates a corporation and the main place where business occurs is located on Richmond Avenue in Staten Island, New York. The company is authorized by the state to transact business. Lena Bagels was incorporated in 2001. A New York Injury Lawyer said the petitioner, Lena Bagels has been found guilty of selling tobacco products to a minor. The petitioner states that the fine of $3500 is void and requests the renewal of their application for their tobacco license. The petitioner is seeking to annul the recommendation made by Judge Mitchell B. Nisonoff.

Published on: July 4, 2012

Claimant moves to serve a late notice of claim – Clark v. Roswell Park Cancer Inst. Corp., 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 20551 (N.Y. Ct. Cl., 2010)

by Stephen Bilkis

The issue in this medical malpractice case is whether the plaintiff/claimant has met the burden of showing why the court should permit him to serve a notice of claim even though the 90-day timeframe has expired. Under New York law, before a plaintiff has the legal right to file a lawsuit against a municipal or governmental entity, it must first serve a notice of claim on the entity. The law requires that the notice of claim is served within 90-days of the incident that forms the basis for the claim.

The claimant seeks to recover damages from defendant Roswell Park Cancer Institute for negligent care that resulted in the claimant having to undergo multiple additional surgeries and an extended recovery period. Roswell is a public corporation, operated by the State of New York. The claimant went to Roswell to have a cancerous mass surgically removed from his lower colon. A few days after the surgery, the claimant was diagnosed with an anastomotic leak to his surgical site. As a result, he had to undergo surgery to repair the leak. Because of the anastomotic leak and complications that resulted from the leak, the claimant had to undergo a colostomy and multiple other surgeries and had to remain at Roswell for over a month. He continued to receive treatment at Roswell and another facility for several additional months.

The claimant failed to timely serve notice of claim, and now seeks leave to serve a late notice of claim. The defendant opposes the claimant’s motion on a variety of grounds. 1). The claimant has not demonstrated a reasonable excuse for not timely serving the noticed; 2). The defendant’s lack of actual or constructive knowledge of the facts on which the claim is based; and 3). The defendant’s case was prejudiced because of the lack of notice.

Published on: July 3, 2012

Statute of limitations for serving notice of claim not tolled under the continuous treatment doctrine- Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d 671, (N.Y. App. Div., 1986)

by Stephen Bilkis

In this case the court determines the issue as to whether the statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim was tolled based on the continuous treatment doctrine. Under New York law, there are special procedural rules that must be followed in order to sue a public entity. Because the defendant Elmhurst General Hospital was owned by the City of New York and operated by New York City Health and Hospital Corporation at the time of the incident at the basis of this lawsuit, the plaintiff was required to follow the special procedures.

Before an injured victim can file a lawsuit against a public entity, the plaintiff must first file a notice of clam with the appropriate public office within 90 days of the date of the negligent act that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. In this case, the malpractice occurred at the time of plaintiff’s baby’s birth, July 3, 1970. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s negligent care during labor and delivery of the baby resulted in neurological damage. As a result, the baby has mental retardation and cerebral palsy.

The plaintiff served notice on February 8, 1980—over 10 years after the negligence and over 10 years after the deadline for serving a notice of claim. Thus, the court had no choice but to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, unless the time for serving notice was tolled. “Tolling” the statute of limitations means pausing or delaying the running of the statute of limitations. In other words, the plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit would have extra time to file his or her claim. In New York, two possible reasons for tolling the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case are due to infancy or due to continuous treatment. After determining that the time for serving notice could not be tolled based on infancy, the plaintiff argues that her filing was not late under the “continuous treatment” rule. The doctrine provides that in a medical malpractice case, the 90-day filing period for serving a claim is tolled if there is a continuous course of treatment for the condition caused by the alleged medical malpractice.

Published on: June 30, 2012

Loss of a one-week pregnancy is considered a “serious injury” under New York insurance law – McKendry v. Thornberry, 872 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2009)

by Stephen Bilkis

The issue in this car accident case is whether, under New York’s insurance law, the plaintiff suffered a “serious injury” when she lost her 1-week old pregnancy as result of the car accident. Under New York Insurance Law § 5104, in order to recover for pain and suffering in a personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must have suffered a serious personal injury. Examples of injuries that are deemed serious include an injury that results in death, dismemberment, disfigurement, loss of the use of a body organ, or loss of a fetus.

In December 2002, the plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a car accident in Troy, New York. As a result, the plaintiff filed a personal injury claim against the defendant, stating the serious injury she suffered was the loss of her unborn child. In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgement dismissal based on 2 issues: 1). The loss of a 1-week pregnancy is not a serious injury; or 2). The plaintiff’s miscarriage was not caused by the car accident.

Defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s miscarriage was not caused by the car accident is based on the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony that she was told by a physician’s assistant that her miscarriage was not caused by the car accident. In addition, the defendant submitted a report from a doctor who asserted that his medical opinion was that the car accident did not lead to the plaintiff’s miscarriage. Despite what she stated in her deposition, the plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of her treating doctor who maintains that the plaintiff’s miscarriage was indeed caused by the car accident. Thus, the plaintiff argues, there is a triable question of fact.

Published on: June 23, 2012

Woman Contends High Risk Pregnancy Wasnt Managed Properly

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiffs in this case are Angel Hunter, who is an infant and represented by his mother, Lisa Aveta, and Lisa Aveta for herself. The defendants in the case are Richmond University Medical Center, Michael Moretti, M.D. and Marino A. Poliseno, D.O. The case is being heard in the Richmond County Supreme Court.

Case Background

Angel, who is an infant in this case, is represented by her mother Aveta. During her deposition, Aveta said that there were diabetes, deafness, brain tumors, and Down’s syndrome, in her family history. A New York Personal Injury Lawyer said she personally has a history of asthma and seizure disorder. She has also had a gynecological surgery. Aveta has been pregnant 14 times and 9 of those times ended in a spontaneous abortion and one ended in neonatal death. Two of her children, including Angel, have seizure disorder. Aveta also has had deliveries that are premature.

Published on: June 20, 2012

Court Discusses Neglect of Children

by Stephen Bilkis

This is a case of alleged neglect of two children; Kamiyah C. and Janiyah T. both are under the age of eighteen. The respondents of the case and the two people accused of neglecting the children are Amanda T. and Lateek C. The case is being heard in the Family Court of Kings County.

Case Background

A New York Injury Lawyer said the respondent mother, Amanda T. is the mother of both of the children in question. Lateek C., the respondent father, is Kamiyah’s father and is personally responsible for Janiyah. The two children were removed from the home of the respondents on the 30th of January, 2007.

Published on: June 12, 2012

Woman Sues for Slip and Fall in Building Lobby

by Stephen Bilkis

A young lady worked in a building along Third Avenue in New York City. One rainy day, she came to the office soaking wet. Her sneakers, raincoat and her umbrella were all soaked. When she got to the lobby of her building, she noticed that the building manger had already put out those yellow signs that warned people that the floor was wet. The building manager also put in square mats on the marble floor of the lobby to make a path for the occupants and visitors to the building to get to the counter of the lobby from the front doors and also from the front doors to the elevators.

A New York Injury Lawyer said the mats were placed on the floor with gaps in between them. The young lady walked on these mats to get to the elevators. As she was walking on the mats, her foot landed on bit of exposed marble floor in between the mats. She had a slip and fall. She stated that when she fell, her hand touched the floor and she did not feel anything wet.

She sued the owner of the building and the building manager for negligence. She alleged that they created a dangerous condition that caused her to slip and fall. She alleged that the mats placed by the building manager caused water to be trapped and to pool in the space between the mats right where the marble floor was very visible.