Personal Injury

Published on: August 19, 2015

New York Appellate Court Rules that Date of Filing Controls Change of Venue Argument

by Stephen Bilkis

For the Supreme Court of the State of New York, the prescribed venue of an action is codified at and statutorily authorized by Article 5 of the CPLR. The statutory scheme provides that “notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the place of trial of an action shall be in the county designated by the plaintiff, unless the place of trial is changed to another county by order of the court upon motion or by consent” (CPLR §509). As such, unless the parties have by prior written agreement fixed the venue of an action, CPLR Article 5 permits the plaintiff the right to make the initial selection of an appropriate venue.

Pursuant to CPLR §503(a), venue is predicated upon the residence of one of the parties at the time the action is commenced, not where the cause of action arose. However, CPLR §510(1) provides that the “court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where: the county designated for that purpose is not a proper county.” And, it is settled that upon a motion by defendants to change said venue, defendants bear the burden to establish that the plaintiff”s choice of forum is not appropriate, or that other factors and circumstances require that venue be changed. In addition, it is settled that “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed”.

Here, defendants fail to demonstrate that plaintiffs move to Pennsylvania shortly after commencing the instant action evidences a lack of intent to retain New York County as a permanent residence sufficient to defeat New York County as a basis for venue.

Published on: November 17, 2014

New York Appellate Court Discusses GBL §§ 349, 350 and 350, Grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint

by Stephen Bilkis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants’ conduct was consumer-oriented. Defendants urge that the term consumer-oriented refers only to those who purchase goods and services for personal, family or household use. Injury Disputes that are unique to the parties do not fall within GBL § 349.

However, the focus of GBL § 349 on consumer orientation does not preclude its application to disputes between businesses per se, but it does severely limit it. Although the statute is, at its core, a consumer protection device, corporate competitors now have standing to bring a claim under this statute so long as some harm to the public at large is at issue.

Here, Defendants fail to demonstrate that from the allegations in the proposed amended complaint, it cannot be inferred that Defendants’ practice has a broader impact on the consumer at large.

Published on: August 18, 2012

Plaintiff Files Motion for Summary Judgement in Car Accident Case

by Stephen Bilkis

On October 31, 1958, a little girl was waiting in a mobile x-ray truck to be x-rayed. She was unaware that just behind the truck, a panel van was attempting to pull away from the curb. The panel van’s rear bumper became interlocked with the bumper of the car that was parked behind him. As the driver pulled around the x-ray van which was also parked against the curb, it pulled the car that was hung onto the bumper forward. The car was forced into the back of the x-ray van. The car accident caused the child to become injured. Her guardian filed a lawsuit against the driver of the van and the company that he worked for.

The driver of the panel van died of natural causes before the case came to court. The company that employed him and owned the panel van that he had been driving on that date admit that the van was there. They admit that the accident was reported to them. They do not know the specifics of the accident because the driver is no longer available to testify. The company asked the court permission to not be held to as high a standard of proof for their case because they are unable to know the details that led up to the accident. The court points out that following the accident, the company asked for and obtained a statement from the now deceased driver in reference to the circumstances surrounding the accident. A Nassau County Personal Injury Lawyer said the court also contends that the company is in fact in possession of an affidavit made by the driver and a copy of the accident report.

The company states that it is their understanding that the vehicle that became hung up on the panel truck was parked illegally. They maintain that there was no contact between their truck and the x-ray truck. They feel that they should not be blamed for the accident. They contend that the driver of the vehicle that was illegally parked and thus was the proximate cause of the accident.

Published on: August 7, 2012

Plaintiff Claims She was Defrauded in Real Estate Transaction, NY Appellate Court Disagrees

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiff in the case is Willie B. Sosa. The defendants in the case are Lorenzo Hines, Eddie Meyers, Harold Hall, and the Estate of Dessie Ree Meyers. The judge in the case is Arthur M. Schack.

About the Case

This is a case that involves a real estate dispute. The real estate in question is the property located at 363 Monroe Street, in Brooklyn, New York. A New York Injury Lawyer said the plaintiff moves to show cause for three branches of relief in the case. The first branch of relief is to stay the thirty-day notice of termination which is dated the 27th of April, 2006. The plaintiff states that this notice violates the notice requirements for ending a tenancy.

Published on: August 4, 2012

Plaintiff Mother Sues Mid-Wife for Medical Malpractice Regarding Serious Birth Injury

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman was found to be pregnant and she went for an ultrasound. It was determined that she was carrying twins. The pregnant woman opted for a home birth instead of giving birth at a hospital. She wanted to be assisted by a midwife and nurses.

A New York Injury Lawyer said she nurse/midwife who had her own clinic and lying-in clinic diagnosed one of the twins to have a weak heart sound: the baby’s heart rate decelerated at times. The nurse/midwife recommended that a follow-up sonogram be done at a hospital. The hospital found that the baby’s heart rate had already stabilized. The woman wanted to give birth at the hospital but she also wanted to be assisted in the birth by her own nurse/midwife. The doctors at the hospital told her that her nurse/midwife did not have credentials or birthing privileges at their hospital. They told her that if she were to decide to give birth at the hospital, she would be cared for by one of the obstetricians on their staff.

The woman left and her pregnancy progressed. She stuck it out under the care of the nurse/midwife. She gave birth at her home on July 1, 2004. One of her twin babies was stillborn. The death certificate as filled out by the nurse/midwife listed the cause of death as undetermined.

Published on: August 2, 2012

Plaintiff Sues in NY Appellate Court Requesting Reversal of Partial Summary Judgement for Defendant

by Stephen Bilkis

The Facts:

In March 1983, plaintiff was admitted to the labor and delivery unit of defendant Hospital. During the course of her labor, plaintiff’s attending physician, defendant-doctor, prescribed pitocin to stimulate her contractions. A New York Injury Lawyer said the drug was administered intravenously to plaintiff and, as a result, her contractions increased in intensity and frequency. Subsequently, plaintiff gave birth to a baby boy. The infant was in respiratory distress at birth and died approximately 6 1/2 hours later (a birth injury or birth injury accident).

Plaintiff and her husband commenced an action alleging negligence and medical malpracticeagainst the hospital, doctor and nurse, who attended to plaintiff throughout her labor and delivery.

Published on: August 1, 2012

Woman with Lung Cancer Sues Tobacco Company for False and Misleading Advertising

by Stephen Bilkis

In 2005, the family of a woman who had died of lung cancer filed a civil suit against four cigarette manufacturing companies for her untimely death. The family stated that the woman had been enticed to start smoking at just 14 years of age and that she had smoked heavily throughout her life. A New York Injury Lawyer said the suite claimed that cigarette manufactures that were named in the suit had enticed her with attractive advertising that displayed cigarettes as harmless and in some situations in the early years of her addiction, the advertisements portrayed cigarettes as a healthy way to prevent illness.

Her family maintains that she was always concerned about her health and that she had taken several steps over the years to improve her risks based on more advertising by the tobacco companies. When the tobacco companies marketed lite cigarettes, they implied that these cigarettes had less tar and carcinogens than regular cigarettes. She switched to lite cigarettes to be more healthy. The family testified that she had tried unsuccessfully to stop smoking on numerous occasions and that she was not successful because she had become addicted to the cigarettes.

The family further stated that the tobacco companies knowingly manufactured these cigarettes that are dangerous, even though there were less dangerous alternatives that they could have produced. The suit specifically stated documentation that showed that the tobacco companies were aware of several options that could be less hazardous to the health of persons who chose to smoke and negligently dismissed producing them. These options included cigarettes made with coarser tobacco so that less of the tar is ingested. Another option that had been dismissed was manufacturing cigarettes without tar or other chemicals that are specifically dangerous. The family noted that the woman had specifically chosen filtered and lite cigarettes in an attempt to make her habit less damaging to her health. That was used as an example of the strength of her addiction as well as her desire to not harm herself with the use of cigarettes.

Published on: July 30, 2012

Mother Appeals Medical Malpractice Action for Birth Injury

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman was pregnant with her second baby in 2003. She gave birth to her first baby in 1997 and all went well. She saw the same obstetrician regularly for her pre-natal check-ups. He found that she was suffering from gestational diabetes during her second pregnancy. He notified her that her baby may be bigger than her first baby.

A New York Injury Lawyer said this was the second pregnancy, the doctor had already established that the woman’s pelvis was sufficient and adequate to allow her to give birth normally. As the woman was delivering her second baby, she was lying flat on the delivery table and her legs were spread apart with her heels hitched onto the stirrups, the woman’s pelvis broke. The bones where the two halves of her pelvis met were relaxed by the hormones of childbirth but the doctor performed a hyper flexion-abduction maneuver after she was given an epidural. She delivered her baby vaginally but after the child’s birth, the mother was rushed for surgery in the same hospital to repair her fractured pelvis with plates and screws. The mother sued the hospital and her obstetrician for medical malpractice for the injury she herself sustained in the course of her delivery and childbirth.

She maintains that her pelvis would not have fractured if the doctor had done his job (medical malpractice) and determined the baby’s delivery weight. The baby was huge because of her gestational diabetes and the mother’s pelvis would not have fractured if the baby were delivered via a cesarean section.

Published on: July 27, 2012

Defendants Request Summary Judgement in NY Appellate Court for Lead Paint Case, Motion Denied

by Stephen Bilkis

The plaintiff in the case is Rickie Scott, et al. The defendant in the case is the City of New York. The judge for this case is Martin M. Solomon.

The Case

The defendant in the case, Bertram Fields, is moving for an order to grant him a summary judgment that dismisses the complaint by the plaintiff. Through a separate motion in the case, the defendant Merco Properties, Inc., is moving for the same relief. The City of New York submits an affirmation that joins in the plaintiff’s opposition to the respective judgments of summary motions made by the defendants.

Published on: July 24, 2012

Plaintiff Contends Physician Did Not Operate Under Proper Standard of Care

by Stephen Bilkis

A medical malpractice action is premised upon the alleged negligence of the physicians relating to the care and treatment rendered to a mother and her infant son during their hospitalization at the hospital. It is alleged that the physicians negligently departed from good and accepted standards of care in treating the infant, commencing with his birth and continuing through his discharge proximately causing the infant to suffer serious and permanent injury.

The pediatrician seeks summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the bases that he appropriately evaluated the infant for hypoglycemia or abnormally low sugar level and that he appropriately ordered treatment and that he did not depart from the hypoglycemia protocol. He also claims that he fully complied with the standard of care during his treatment of the infant. It is further asserted that his care and treatment of the infant was not the cause of the infant’s alleged birth injuries.

A New York Injury Lawyer said the obstetrician seeks order without trial to dismiss the complaint as asserted against him on the bases that there is no evidence that he participated in the prenatal care and treatment of the mother, and therefore, the claims asserted against him pertaining to the prenatal period should be dismissed. He also contends that there is no evidence that he participated in the care and treatment of the mother other than between approximately 11:15 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. on May 23, 2003, and that any claims pertaining to any other time period should be dismissed. A fellow obstetrician contends that there is no evidence that he participated in the mother’s prenatal care other than one office visit on February 13, 2003, and a consultation on April 10, 2003, and therefore, all other claims asserted against him should be dismissed. Both obstetricians contend that the prenatal care and treatment provided to the mother was appropriate and within good and accepted medical practice, and that there is nothing that they did or did not do that proximately caused the infant to suffer the injuries claimed in the legal action.