Articles Posted in Queens

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In a birth injury case, the court examines whether the actions of a volunteer midwife fall under the “Good Samaritan” rule, and as a result, the defendant should be granted summary judgement.

The plaintiff Lacy, who was carrying twins, opted for a home birth instead of giving birth at a hospital. She wanted to be assisted by a midwife and nurses. She hired defendant Delettera, a midwife, to assist with homebirth. Defendant Delettera invited defendant Chachere to assist with the process. On June 24, 2004, plaintiff had a sonogram which indicated a deceleration in the heartbeat of one of the twins. After following up at Stony Brook University Hospital, the hospital determined that the baby’s heartbeat had stabilized. The plaintiff then indicated that she wanted to give birth at Nassau University Medical Center. She requested that defendant Delettera assist, but Delettera did not have birthing credentials there. The plaintiff was told that if she wanted to deliver her baby at Nassau, it would have to be under the care of a doctor. The plaintiff refused and decided to give birth at home. On July 1, 2004, the plaintiff gave birth at home and one of the babies was stillborn. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against a number of defendants, including Delettera, Delettera’s company, and Chachere.

Chachere filed a motion for summary judgement, arguing that she was merely a lay student observer, and that the claim against her should be dismissed. Chachere claimed that her role was restricted to observing, taking pictures, making chart entries, and injecting Pitocin at the direction of defendant Delettera. Therefore, she argued, there was no connection between her presence and the harm to the plaintiff because she did not assist in the actual birth and had no contact with the mother or the deceased child. In support of her motion for summary judgement, defendant Chachere submitted an affidavit of a board-certified maternal-fetal physician. His opinion was that the baby’s death was due to the failure of the nurse/midwife to document the fetal heart rate during the home birth. He also asserted that because Chachere had no role in the pre-natal or post-natal care of the mother or the twins, the baby’s death cannot be attributed to any of her actions.

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Plaintiffs include several members of the Scott family, including 19 children, who resided at the Brooklyn Arms Hotel which is owned by defendant Fields. The Hotel was leased to Merco. In 1981 the plaintiffs were homeless. The City of New York placed them in the hotel. The plaintiffs claim that from the years 1981 through 1984, several of the Scott children were exposed to lead paint while at the hotel. The plaintiffs also claim that while they lived at the hotel there were no attempts made to correct the hazardous lead paint condition. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the plaintiffs based on negligence, recklessness, and gross negligence. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that the Housing and Maintenance Code for New York City was violated.

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgement dismissing the case. The purpose of a summary judgement motion is to ask the court to dismiss the case without the case having to go to trial. The court will grant a motion for summary dismissal of a case if the defendant produces evidence that demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact. This means that based on the undisputed facts, the law requires that the defendant wins.

In support of their summary judgement motion, the defendants make arguments related to not being aware of the problem, not having regular access to the premises, not having control over the premises, and not being aware that children lived there. The court determined that some of the defendants’ arguments are specious. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion, the court concluded that there were indeed questions of fact. For example, the court found that there were questions of fact with regard to whether the defendants were aware that paint was peeling the Hotel, whether they were aware that children under the age of 7 lived in the Hotel, and who had complete and exclusive control over the Hotel. Thus, on the issue of negligence, the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement. However, the court did grant the defendants’ summary judgement motion to the extent that the plaintiffs will not be allowed to recover claims related to the breach of warranty of habitability or their claims of nuisance.

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When a doctor fails to perform a c-section delivery when warranted, there is a risk that the mother or baby will suffer serious birth injuries, including permanent injuries to the brain. Plaintiff Mitchell filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of her infant son against defendants Lograno, Strittmatter, and the hospital. Mitchell argues that because the doctors did not perform a c-section delivery, there were negligent, and as a result, her son suffered permanent brain injuries.

Two days prior to her expected delivery date, Mitchell was given a test that showed that her baby’s heartbeat was non-reactive. Mitchell was transferred to a hospital for additional tests and monitoring. Defendant Lograno, Michell’s doctor, discussed options with her and decided to induce a vaginal delivery using Pitocin. Before Lograno left for the evening, he discussed Mitchell’s case with Strittmatter. It was agreed that the baby would be delivered via vaginal delivery. Strittmatter performed the delivery. The baby suffered a number of injuries during the delivery, including brain damage. Mitchell filed a personal injury lawsuit against Lograno, Strittmatter, and the hospital, arguing that as a result of not performing a c-section, her baby suffered serious injuries including a brain damage. Lograno and Strittmatter moved for summary judgement dismissal of the case.

A motion for summary judgment dismal seeks a judgement on all or part of the case in a summary fashion, without the issue or case being fully litigated at trial. In this case the defendants are asking the judge to decide the case in their favor, immediately, without a trial. The legal standard for summary dismissal is that the defendants must show that there are “no genuine issues of material fact” and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In other words, the defendant must show that based on undisputed facts presented, the defendant must win because the law supports the defendants’ position.

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In this birth injury medical malpractice case, the defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that he did not deviate from accepted medical standards in his care and treatment of a pregnant woman by delaying performing a cesarean section delivery despite evidence that the baby was in distress.

Plaintiff McLaughlin filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of her infant son who was born in 1998 prematurely with an extremely low birth weight. The plaintiff contends that as a result of the negligent care of the defendants, her son suffered a variety of serious, permanent birth injuries including brain damage; status encephalopathy; fetal hypoxia; cerebral palsy; exacerbation of injuries related to prematurity; developmental delays; cognitive and speech deficits; and the need for braces on his extremities.

On September 5, 1998, the plaintiff, who was 23 weeks pregnant, was admitted to St. Charles Hospital with swelling of the legs and decreased fetal movement. St. Charles Hospital (a non-defendant) transferred the plaintiff to Stony Brook Hospital so that she would have access to its neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) in case the baby had to be delivered prematurely.

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The issues before the court in Stuart v. Health & Hosps Corp. are whether a plaintiff is permitted to amend her complaint based on a change in the law that occurred after she initially filed her claim and whether the new law should be applied retroactively.

In 2000, plaintiff Ashmeade filed a medical malpractice claim on behalf of her deceased son who was born with brain damage and cerebral palsy. Plaintiff claims that the injuries suffered by her son, who was born in 1996, were due to the negligent care by the defendant. In the complaint there were two causes of action. First, on behalf of her son, the plaintiff sought recovery for pain and suffering. The second cause of action was based upon a lack of informed consent.

At the time that the plaintiff file her claim, the law did not give a mother a cause of action for emotional distress in cases where her baby was stillborn or was severely impaired at birth. However, in 2004 the New York Court of Appeals changed the law when it decided Broadnax v. Gonzalez,  777 N.Y.S.2d 416 (2004). The court held that if medical negligence resulted in a miscarriage or stillbirth, then there was also a violation of duty of care to the mother. As a result, she would be entitled to damages for emotional distress. The same year, the court decided Sheppard-Mobley v King (10 AD3d 70 [2004]). This case focused on a child who was born severely impaired. The court held that even if the mother did not suffer a physical injury, if the child is born severely impaired, the mom would be entitled to damages for emotional harm because there would have been a violation of duty of care owed to the mother. Because of these two rulings, the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint filed on behalf of her son to include a claim for her own emotional distress. The defendant opposes the plaintiff’s motion.

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In this case the court determines the issue as to whether the statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim was tolled based on the continuous treatment doctrine. Under New York law, there are special procedural rules that must be followed in order to sue a public entity. Because the defendant Elmhurst General Hospital was owned by the City of New York and operated by New York City Health and Hospital Corporation at the time of the incident at the basis of this lawsuit, the plaintiff was required to follow the special procedures.

Before an injured victim can file a lawsuit against a public entity, the plaintiff must first file a notice of clam with the appropriate public office within 90 days of the date of the negligent act that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. In this case, the malpractice occurred at the time of plaintiff’s baby’s birth, July 3, 1970. According to the plaintiff, the defendant’s negligent care during labor and delivery of the baby resulted in neurological damage. As a result, the baby has mental retardation and cerebral palsy.

The plaintiff served notice on February 8, 1980—over 10 years after the negligence and over 10 years after the deadline for serving a notice of claim. Thus, the court had no choice but to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, unless the time for serving notice was tolled. “Tolling” the statute of limitations means pausing or delaying the running of the statute of limitations. In other words, the plaintiff in a personal injury lawsuit would have extra time to file his or her claim. In New York, two possible reasons for tolling the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case are due to infancy or due to continuous treatment. After determining that the time for serving notice could not be tolled based on infancy, the plaintiff argues that her filing was not late under the “continuous treatment” rule. The doctrine provides that in a medical malpractice case, the 90-day filing period for serving a claim is tolled if there is a continuous course of treatment for the condition caused by the alleged medical malpractice.

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In a medical malpractice claim, the issue before the court is whether the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for filing a late notice of claim. Under New York law, before a plaintiff can bring a lawsuit against a public or government entity, the plaintiff must first file a notice of claim. The purpose of a notice of claim is to give the government entity advance warning that a lawsuit is pending that involves a claim for damages. It allows the government the opportunity to investigate the incident and the merits of the claim. In the Velazquez case, the defendants are the City of New York Health and Hospitals Corporation, the public entity that operates Jacobi Medical Center. The plaintiff was required to serve the notice within 90 days of the incident that led to the medical malpractice claim.

The infant plaintiff was born at Jacobi Medical Center in March 1998. At birth he weighed one pound, nine ounces, and remained in the neonatal intensive care unit until July 6, 1998. At age 4 he was diagnosed with spastic cerebral palsy and asthma. However, his parents did not file a notice of claim on his behalf until October 11, 2006– 8 years later. The plaintiff claimed that due to the defendant’s medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent, he was injured.

Clearly the plaintiff did not serve the notice of claim within 90 days of his birth in 1998. The court must now determine if, despite filing the notice of claim 8 years after the incident, the plaintiff filed the notice timely. The plaintiff filed a motion requesting the court to issue an order deeming the notice of claim served to be timely or, in the alternative, granting leave to serve a late notice of claim. New York law does allow exceptions to the 90-day rule statutory timeframe. In making its decision, the court must look at 3 factors: 1). whether the plaintiff provided a reasonable excuse for the late serving of the notice of claim; 2). whether the municipality had actual notice of the essential facts of the claim within 90-days after the claim arose; and 3) whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in its defense.

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The respondent for the case is Ivelisse T. This case concerns the alleged abuse and neglect of two children under the age of eighteen, Rosaly S. Marcos S, and Wesley R. The case is being heard in the Kings County Family Court. Daniel Fraidstern, Esq., is the Special Assistant Corporation Counsel for the Administration of Children’s Services. The attorney for the respondent mother is Michael S. Somma Jr. The Attorney for the children is Fred Allen Wertheimer.

Case Background

The respondent in the case is the mother of Wesley R., Marcos S., and Rosaly S. Before this case the children all lived in Brooklyn with the respondent and Christian A., her husband.

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The issue in this car accident case is whether, under New York’s insurance law, the plaintiff suffered a “serious injury” when she lost her 1-week old pregnancy as result of the car accident. Under New York Insurance Law § 5104, in order to recover for pain and suffering in a personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must have suffered a serious personal injury. Examples of injuries that are deemed serious include an injury that results in death, dismemberment, disfigurement, loss of the use of a body organ, or loss of a fetus.

In December 2002, the plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a car accident in Troy, New York. As a result, the plaintiff filed a personal injury claim against the defendant, stating the serious injury she suffered was the loss of her unborn child. In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgement dismissal based on 2 issues: 1). The loss of a 1-week pregnancy is not a serious injury; or 2). The plaintiff’s miscarriage was not caused by the car accident.

Defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s miscarriage was not caused by the car accident is based on the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony that she was told by a physician’s assistant that her miscarriage was not caused by the car accident. In addition, the defendant submitted a report from a doctor who asserted that his medical opinion was that the car accident did not lead to the plaintiff’s miscarriage. Despite what she stated in her deposition, the plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of her treating doctor who maintains that the plaintiff’s miscarriage was indeed caused by the car accident. Thus, the plaintiff argues, there is a triable question of fact.

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Queens Birth Injury 15

This case is being heard in the Special Term of the Queens County Supreme Court. The original plaintiffs of the case are John Joseph Shea III, who is an infant under 14 years old, represented by his guardian John Joseph Shea II and John Joseph Shea II individually. The defendants are Otto Gitlin, d/b/a Queens Memorial Hospital, Jane Stidolph (first name is fictitious), and Dr. John Uvetich. Stidolph and Dr. Uvetich are third party plaintiffs versus the third party defendants Dr. Samuel Weiner and Dr. S.J. Rosoff.

Third Party Case

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