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Dog Bite Victim Allowed to Pursue Negligence Claim. Flanders v Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261

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In April 2025, the New York Court of Appeals reversed long-standing precedent by allowing a dog bite victim to pursue a negligence claim, not just a strict liability claim. Rebecca Flanders worked as a postal carrier. On December 8, 2018, she delivered a package to the home of Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow. Their mailbox was missing, so Flanders pulled into the driveway and approached the front door. She did not see any warnings about a dog on the property. As she handed the package to Stephen Goodfellow, she heard a dog approaching inside the house. The dog ran through the open door and bit her on the shoulder, causing serious injury that later required multiple surgeries.

The Goodfellows had owned the dog for several years. It weighed about 70 pounds. They had hired a trainer due to behavioral issues, including incidents where the dog dragged Michelle to the ground while on a leash. The trainer noted that the dog got into a fight with another dog but did not observe aggression toward people. According to the Goodfellows, the dog had not previously bitten or attacked anyone.

However, two other postal workers submitted sworn affidavits describing the dog’s behavior during their deliveries. Both workers stated that the dog growled, snarled, and slammed into the windows as if trying to break through. One described it as the most aggressive dog on his route. Neither had reported the behavior formally but believed the homeowners should have seen or heard it.

Flanders sued the Goodfellows, seeking damages for her injuries. Her complaint included causes of action for strict liability and negligence.

Question Before the Court
The key legal questions before the Court of Appeals were:

  1. Did the lower courts properly dismiss the strict liability claim on the grounds that the Goodfellows lacked knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities?
  2. Should the longstanding rule in Bard v Jahnke be overruled to allow a victim to recover under a common-law negligence theory even when there is no evidence of a dog’s prior violent behavior?

Court’s Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings. It reinstated both Flanders’s strict liability and negligence claims.

First, the court held that there was a triable issue of fact on whether the Goodfellows had constructive knowledge of their dog’s dangerous behavior. The affidavits from other postal workers supported the claim that the dog’s conduct—snarling, growling, slamming into windows—could have been known by the Goodfellows if they were home at the time or reviewed surveillance footage. This behavior was enough to support a claim that the dog had shown a pattern that put others at risk.

Second, the court overruled its prior decision in Bard v Jahnke, which had blocked negligence claims for injuries caused by domestic animals. The court held that this rule was inconsistent with general tort principles and unfairly limited recovery for victims. It stated that owners of domestic animals may now be sued under a negligence theory, regardless of whether the animal had shown a history of aggression. This ruling brought New York law in line with the majority of other states and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Discussion
For decades, New York courts required dog bite victims to prove that the owner knew or should have known about the dog’s vicious tendencies. This strict liability standard did not allow victims to sue under negligence unless the animal had previously displayed aggressive conduct and the owner was aware of it.

In this case, the court found that the strict liability claim should not have been dismissed because the dog’s conduct, as described by multiple witnesses, may have been visible and audible to the owners. A jury could reasonably find that the owners should have been aware of the risk the dog posed, especially if the dog consistently behaved this way when deliveries were made.

The more significant development in this decision was the rejection of the Bard rule. That 2006 case had denied a negligence claim by a worker who was attacked by a bull on a dairy farm, holding that animal owners could only be liable if they had knowledge of a specific animal’s dangerous tendencies. In Flanders, the court concluded that this rule was out of step with how negligence claims work in most other areas of tort law. It also pointed out that multiple courts and legal scholars had criticized the Bard rule for being too rigid and unfair to injured parties.

The court noted that tort law generally allows a victim to recover if the defendant failed to act with reasonable care under the circumstances. There is no logical reason why dog owners should be treated differently from drivers, business owners, or property managers when it comes to acting with care to avoid injury to others. By allowing negligence claims, the court aligned liability for animal-related injuries with standard tort principles.

This decision also reduced uncertainty caused by the various exceptions courts had carved out to the Bard rule over the years. For example, courts had allowed negligence claims in cases involving wandering animals on roadways or when a veterinary clinic failed to secure an aggressive animal. These piecemeal exceptions created confusion. With Flanders, the court established a clear rule: owners of domestic animals may be held liable in negligence when they fail to take reasonable precautions to prevent foreseeable harm.

Conclusion
The decision in Flanders v Goodfellow changed New York law on injuries caused by domestic animals. It clarified that a victim may pursue both strict liability and negligence claims. Strict liability still requires proof that the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s dangerous behavior. But now, a victim may also argue that the owner failed to act with reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm—even if the animal had no prior history of attacks.

 

 

 

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