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In Jones v. State of New York, 33 N.Y.2d 275 (1973), the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the State could be held liable for the wrongful death of a State employee killed during the retaking of Attica Correctional Facility following a prison uprising. The case raised questions about the limits of sovereign immunity and whether the State’s conduct during an official action could give rise to liability under a theory of intentional tort.
Background Facts
Herbert W. Jones, Jr. worked for the New York State Department of Correctional Services as an accounts clerk at the Attica State Correctional Facility. His job was clerical, and he had no responsibilities involving the guarding or control of inmates. On September 9, 1971, an uprising broke out at Attica. During the disturbance, Jones was taken hostage along with other staff members.
On September 13, 1971, the State began a retaking operation at the prison. During that operation, Jones was shot and killed. An autopsy later revealed that he died from gunshot wounds to the head, chest, and back.
His widow, Lynda Jones, filed a claim against the State of New York in the Court of Claims, seeking compensation for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and wrongful death. She filed two causes of action. The first alleged that the State was negligent for failing to warn Mr. Jones of the imminent risk of a riot. The second alleged that a State trooper intentionally and unjustifiably shot Mr. Jones during the retaking of the prison.
The State moved to dismiss both claims, arguing that workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy and that the State was protected by sovereign immunity.
Question Before the Court
The main legal questions were:
- Whether the State was shielded from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity for conduct during a prison uprising.
- Whether the State was liable for negligence or intentional tort committed by its employees in the course of a governmental operation.
Court’s Decision
The Court of Appeals divided the case into two claims and ruled differently on each:
- The court upheld the dismissal of the negligence claim. It found that because Mr. Jones was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his injury, the Workers’ Compensation Law applied. As a result, that claim could not be pursued against the State in court.
- The court reinstated the second cause of action, which alleged an intentional tort. The court ruled that a claim alleging a State trooper willfully and without justification shot Mr. Jones was not barred by sovereign immunity and could proceed under the theory of respondeat superior. The court cited past cases where the State had been held liable for assaults by troopers during arrests or investigations.
The court found that if the claimant could prove the trooper used more force than was necessary, the State could be held liable for wrongful death.
Discussion
The Court of Appeals clarified how the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity under section 8 of the Court of Claims Act applies to torts committed by State employees. Even when employees are performing functions that are considered governmental—such as arresting individuals or retaking a prison—the State can still be held responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
In this case, the claimant alleged that a State trooper shot Mr. Jones without justification while he was being held as a hostage. The State argued that the trooper was acting in a governmental capacity, and therefore immune from suit. The Court rejected that view, explaining that prior cases had allowed liability for assaults committed by police officers and State troopers during official duties.
The Court cited several prior decisions, including Kline v. State of New York, where a similar claim of excessive force by troopers had been permitted to proceed. In that case, as in Jones, the troopers’ conduct was found to fall within the type of intentional torts for which the State could be held liable.
The Court also addressed the State’s argument that the riot itself insulated the State from liability. The judges rejected that reasoning, stating that the fact that Mr. Jones was killed during the Attica uprising did not change the basic rule of liability. The Court compared the retaking of the prison to other official law enforcement actions, such as an arrest or investigation, where excessive force could still result in State liability.
Importantly, the Court acknowledged that proving an intentional shooting without justification during a large and chaotic operation would be difficult. However, the Court emphasized that this difficulty did not justify dismissal at the pleading stage. The claimant would be allowed to proceed with discovery and present her case at trial.
The Court referred to the findings of the McKay Commission, which investigated the events at Attica. The Commission reported that the assault by troopers was marred by use of excessive force and that the type of ammunition used presented a high risk to inmates and hostages. These findings, while not binding, supported the claimant’s argument that the force used may not have been justified under the circumstances.
Conclusion
This case highlighted the legal responsibility of the State when its employees cause injury during official actions. It reinforced the principle that State employees, including law enforcement officers, are not exempt from civil accountability when their conduct causes harm without justification.
If you or someone you know has been injured due to the actions of a State employee, contact an experienced New York personal injury lawyer at Stephen Bilkis & Associates to learn about your rights.